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SWITCHING REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF EIS FOR STOCKHOLDERS
AND NON-STOCKHOLDERS
SHENG GUO
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
A. This paper analyzes a panel data set of Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) households and demonstrates that the estimate of EIS (Elasticity
of Intertemporal Substitution) for stockholders and non-stockholders is large and
different between them, based upon the consumption-based capital asset pricing
model (CAPM). However, recognizing possible laxities in defining and measur-
ing stockholding status, and hence allowing for possible misclassification error
therein, I use the switching regression framework to show the evidence that there
is a significant portion of stockholders misclassified as non-stockholders. The cor-
rection for this misclassification error results in closer gap of EIS between these
two groups. Estimates after the correction are in line with those found in repeated
cross-section Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) samples, whereas estimates
without the correction are not. This illustrates the importance of accounting for
misclassification error in such contexts. To some extent this result along with oth-
ers of this research validates the use of repeated cross-section data in quatitative
estimation of CAPM.
1. I
EIS, defined as the elasticity of the ratio of consumption between two periods
with respect to the relative price of consumption between the same two periods, is
one of the most important economic concepts to study individuals’ intertemporal
consumption choices. Earlier literature explores economywide aggregate variables
in estimation (Hansen and Singleton 1982, Hansen and Singleton 1983, Hall 1988).
Hall (1988) argues that if approapriately estimated, the EIS should be very small,
close to zero, or even in the negative territory. Recent literature utilizes micro
data sets and attempts to identify the subset of individuals that are supposed
to respond to changes of real interest rates (Vissing-Jørgensen 2002a, Attanasio,
Banks, and Tanner 2002). These studies estimate EIS from consumption data often
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using repeated cross-section sample : variables of interest (such as consumption,
family size change) are averaged across observations for each wave available
to obtain a long time series of these variables. They find large estimates for
stockholders or bondholders but not so for non-stakeholders, with estimates for
the latter essentially complying with Hall’s (1988) claims.
However, when measuring a person’s stock market participation, this approach
encounters its own problem: due to cross-section nature of data, no observations’s
market participation status can be observed over all of the years. If an observa-
tion appears more than once in consecutive interviews, her consumption growth
can be defined and measured, so is her stockholding status from these adjacent
periods; simple cross-section averages can be computed on such defined stock-
holders and non-stockholders just the same as those in Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a).
Any systematic misclassification existing between these two groups will bias their
cross-section averages, and this bias will not vanish no matter how large the sam-
ple size is. For example, if true stockholders tend to underreport their holdings or
hide their stockholding status and hence are more likely to be subject to misclassi-
fication into non-stockholders, the bias in estimation due to this misclassification
will never be corrected no matter how large the sample size of stockholders is. If,
worse than that, one observation only appears once in the data, researchers would
have to resort to computing sample averages of variables for the observations with
propensity scores of stockholdings exceeding some predesignated critical value
(Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner 2002). However, still, whether this propensity score
is affected by misclassification error of stockholders versus non-stockholders is
unable to be addressed, and if there is any, the estimates will still be contaminated.
The availability of panel data enables me to evaluate the potential problem of
misclassification and compare with those studies’ results whether there will be
any bias in estimates. Consequently, the second step of the estimation procedure
employed below are not readily applied to cross-section averages. Moreover, in
contrast to above studies, the availability of panel data where an observation’s
stockholding status is observed all over the years enables me to evaluate how
severely the misclassification will affect estimates, or even how misclassifications
differ according to different definitions. To my best knowledge, no other papers
have taken on the issue of misclassification errors when estimating EIS seperately
for stockholders and non-stockholders.
A call for evaluating the quality of stockholder status data, before categorizing
observations according to its values, is not something peculiar. Research on aspects
of other large-scale data sources has discovered significant misreporting error that
is not affordable to ignore. Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) find
that job changers are more likely to misreport their status, i.e., to report that they
have not changed their jobs. Poterba and Summers (1995) illustrates that as high
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as 10% of the truly unemployed were misclassified as not in the labor force in the
Current Population Survey (CPS). In light of these results, it is hardly convincing
that stockholding status data are not subject to any incidence of misclassification
errors. In theory, stockholders should be those who optimize their intertemporal
consumption at the interior solution. Any kinds of systematic measurement errors
in stockholding status will lead to misclassification of stockholders versus non-
stockholders in accordance to their theoretical definitions, and thus give rise to
inconsistency in estimates.
Beyond the misclassification issue, my exploration of the PSID panel sample,
which keeps track of same individuals over time, reveals that no systematic cross-
section unobserved heterogeneity is evident in the sample, perhaps because dif-
ferencing in logarithm of consumption has swept out much of the unobserved
heterogeneity between individual observations. This piece of evidence is in sup-
port of the legitimacy of use of repeated cross-sections that have comprehen-
sive information on consumption to construct long time-series for research on
consumption-based asset pricing models, barring from sampling error.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the estimation
CAPM model from the intertemporal rational choice framework; Section 3 gives
an overview of the data and estimate the model without correction for misclassifi-
cation; Section 4 motivates the possibility of misclassification linked to the current
context, estimate the model with correction for misclassifications and discuss the
results; Section 5 summarizes.
2. T M
Consider the standard consumption-based asset pricing model with CRRA un-
tility functions (hence the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of consump-
tion is not seperated from the risk aversion parameter) under complete market
structure. This model, due to Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1984), underlies a
large body of literature. Although this setup does not allow for the seperation
between EIS and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (Hall 1988, Epstein and
Zin 1989), it is fine given my goal of this chapter is to illuminate possible impacts
of misclassification error on estimates.
For a household indexed by i at the time period t, augment the conventional util-
ity function with observable control variables Wi,t, unobserved household-specific
heterogeneity vi and other uncounted disturbance effects and/or measurement
error u˜i,t that is orthogonal to vi (Zeldes 1989, Attanasio and Low 2004)
U(Ci,t,Wi,t, vi,ui,t) =
C1−γi,t
1 − γ exp(δWi,t + vi + u˜i,t) (2.1)
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This specification assumes the heterogeneity in consumption tastes can be de-
composed into a common EIS, a common discount rate (ρ, see below) and other
heterogeneous factors, namely, vi and u˜i,t across households.
The single most essential implication derived from this model is the stochastic
Euler equation
Et
((
Ci,t+1
Ci,t
)−γ
exp(δ 4Wi,t+1 + 4u˜i,t+1)1 + Rt+11 + ρ
)
= 1 (2.2)
where ρ is the discount rate, γ is the risk aversion parameter (the reciprocal of EIS),
Rt+1 is the real net rate of return of a particular asset between time t and t + 1, and
Et is the expectations operator conditional on the agent’s information set at time t.
Ci,t is the measured level of consumption as of time t. 4Wi,t+1 = Wi,t+1 −Wi,t, and
likewise for 4u˜i,t+1. Note that household-specific effects, vi, are swept out in the
differencing.
In view of that data may not be available for every period of t, (2.2) needs to
be modified so as to account for this possibility; especially, the rates of return
from financial markets should be appropriately timed. For instance, for the time
interval from t to t + τ, the Euler equation is
Et
((
Ci,t+τ
Ci,t
)−γ
exp(δ 4Wi,t+τ + 4u˜i,t+τ)1 + Rt,t+τ1 + ρ
)
= 1 (2.3)
in which Rt,t+τ refers to the rate of return from t to t + τ. This is ensured by the
law of no arbitrage: if the equation (2.3) fails to hold for any particular period
from t to t + τ, it implies the agent can increase her utility from reallocating
consumptions from this period to other period, hence contradicts the conclusion
of having achieved the optimal consumption.
Following the log-linearized approximation in Attanasio and Low (2004), equa-
tion (2.2) could be rewritten as (use σ ≡ 1/γ to denote EIS)
4 log Ci,t+1 = σ log(1 + Rt+1) + σδ 4Wi,t+1 + α¯i + ui,t+1 (2.4)
where the regression constant, α¯i, includes the log of common discount factor,
and the unconditional mean of second and higher moments of this household’s
consumption growth and rates of return. The residual ui,t+1 includes 4u˜i,t+1, ex-
pectational errors, and deviation of second and higher moments of consumption
growth and rates of return from the unconditional mean. A similar multi-period
linearized equation will hold corresponding to equation (2.3).
Due to the inclusion of elements of second and higher moments of consumption
growth and rates of return, ui,t+1 will be correlated with the contemporaneous
rate of return log(1 + Rt+1). Two-stage least squares can be used to address this
concern : in the first stage, time-series stock returns are predicted from regressions
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of log(1 + Rt+1) on the vector of instrumental variables (including righ-hand side
variables themselves) Ii,t; this predicted stock return will then be plugged into
place of (2.4) at the second stage. So long as some of variables in 4Wi,t+1 differ
between households, the fitted value of R will differ between households even
for the same period. Therefore I use log(1 + R̂i,t+1) to denote the fitted values of
log(1 + Rt+1) for household i. This step is somewhat a counterpart of obtaining
cross-section averages in using repeated cross-section data.
If R refers to the rate of return in stock market, equation (2.2) (and hence (2.4))
only makes sense for stockholders, for they are the investors on the margin. Sim-
ilarly, if R refers to bond returns, the same equation only makes sense for bond-
holders. The reasons why there is only limited participation in the stock market
are out of the scope of this paper1. Following Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a), I will
estimate equation (2.4) separately for stockholders and non-stockholders, but the
parameters for the non-stockholder group are by no means eligible for structural
interpretation, whereas the parameters for the stockholder group are. However,
recognizing the definition, and hence the classification, of stockholders and non-
stockholders are imperfect, a major contribution of this paper is to call for the
switching regression estimation to account for possible misclassification, which
will be detailed in Section 4.
3. T D  C E
3.1. Data Overview. The PSID survey was conducted once a year from 1975 to
1996, and once every two years from 1997 to 2005. Financial variables such as
rates of return are correspondingly timed in view of the two-year gaps from 1997
to 2005, as well as the three-year gap of 1987 to 1990 when food consumption data
are not collected for 1988 and 1989. I restrict my sample to only those household
heads who have headed the same household all over these years. The overall
sample size composed by these households is 1214.
For consumpton measurements, each component of PSID consumption (food
consumed at home, food eaten out, utilities and transportation expenses, et cetera)
is deflated by the respective category-level CPI (2000Q1=100) before added up
or used as predictors of the aggregate consumption measure. The first-quarter
numbers of CPI series are used conforming to the timing of PSID surveys. The
earliest and latest available year of this series are 1979 and 2003; therefore I use
numbers of 1979 for years prior to 1979 and numbers of 2003 for the year 2004.
1Vissing-Jørgensen (2002b) and Attanasio and Paiella (2006) respectively propose transaction-cost
based models to explain the limited market participation and estimate relevant parameters therein,
under certain simplified assumptions.
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CPI series and subsequent CEX data, which are used for aggregate consumption
prediction later, are all from those used by Anguiar and Hurst (2008).
For stock market rates of return, I use NYSE value-weighted returns (including
dividend distributions) deflated by CPI. The dividend-price ratio is calculated in
the same way as in Fama and French (1988), and the bond horizon premium and
bond default premium are defined in the same way as in Fama and French (1989)
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) and computed in Ibbotson Associates (2007). Stock
market rates of return are correspondingly matched with respect to consumption
growth according to (2.4), for instance, the rate of return in 1975, computed as the
sum of distributed dividends and the capital appreciation from the end of year
1974 to the end of year 1975, is matched with the growth of consumption in 1974
to that in 1975.
For the definitions of stockholders and non-stockholders, I adopt two different
measures. The first is to classify the observation (household head) as stockholders
if his/her household owns positive stockholdings over all of the years between 1984
to 2005 when such information is ever available (denoted by the dummy variable
D3); the second is to classify the observation as stockholders if the household
owns positive stockholdings in year 1984 (denoted by the dummy variable D4),
the first year when the survey began to ask for such information. Apparently
the first definition is more stringent than the second, and the second is legitimate
only under the assumption that once someone begins to hold stocks in the initial
period, s/he is always ”‘in”’ the stock market even if at certain points of time later
s/he does not own any positive stockholdings2.
Variables included in the probability prediction equation of stockholding status
are all at their 1984 level. The wealth variable refers to the level of 1984 family
wealth not including home equity. Some of the households’ 1984 wealth is nega-
tive; to get a meaningful logarithm transformation, I add a constant number to each
family’s wealth value and then convert them into the logarithm scale. This will
not change the ranking of wealth between households and using the transformed
variable is legitimate for probability prediction purposes.
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of variables of interest for stockholders
and non-stockholders defined by D3. Compared to non-stockholders, stockholders
are more wealthy, more educated, have smaller family size and consume more.
3.2. Conventional Estimation Results. I start with the estimation of a random-
effect version which models α¯i as the persistent, unobserved hetereogeneity across
households. Aggregate econmic shocks may hit upon all households for the same
2As predicted by a fixed transaction-cost in participation hypothesis, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002b)
confirms that PSID households who participated in 1984 stock market are 31.8 percentage more
likely to participate in 1989, controlling for a number of variables of observed heterogeneity.
SWITCHING REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF EIS FOR STOCKHOLDERS AND NON-STOCKHOLDERS7
year, therefore I cluster standard errors of ui,t+1 by years. Yet estimation results
yield no support for a cross-section distribution of α¯i: its variance is essentially
zero, regardless of whether instrument variables are used or not. A fixed-effect
version does not work as well. This may be seen as the evidence in favor of
the repeated cross-section average approach employed in the literature. Without
controlling for unobserved fixed effects, the regressions are equivalent to pooling
various years of a same household as different households’ observations. Table 2
shows that estimated coefficients from GMM estimation are similar to those from
OLS and IV estimation with slightly smaller standard errors. In almost every esti-
mation method, the standard error increases after clustering adjustment whereas
the managnitude of the estimated coefficient undergoes no change compared with
no adjustment at all, in other words, statistical significance is lost after adjusting
for clustered year effects. This is acceptable since I only have around 20 years of
time-series dimension for the data.
For the first-stage estimation, one-period (one year prior to 1997, and two years
after 1997) lagged dividend-price ratios, lagged bond horizon premia and bond
default premia are used as the instrument variable. For example, to instrument for
the stock real return from the end of year 1974 to the end of year 1975, the lagged
dividend-price ratio refers to the sum of dividends for the year 1974 divided by
the portofolio value at the end of 1974, so are the timings of agged bond horizon
premia and bond default premia. This is consistent with the literature (Fama and
French 1988, Fama and French 1989). The correlation between these instruments
and logarithm of NYSE real returns is very strong, for instance, an OLS regression
of logarithm of lagged dividend-price ratios on logarithm of NYSE real returns
yields an coefficient 0.2278 with stardard error 0.0816 and ajusted R-squared 0.2135.
Table 2 presents the conventional estimates of EIS for stockholders and non-
stockholders, as defined by the dummy variable D’s. The top panel uses annual
changes of family food consumption as the dependent variable. The bottom panel
uses the similar measurement of aggregate consumption of nondurable goods and
services, based on the methodology in Skinner (1987): predicting the aggregate
consumption by its individual components available in PSID where the weight
before each component is taken from the regression of these components from
CEX samples. My regressors do not include value of house value or rent that
is of durable consumption feature, following the preassumption that only non-
durable goods and services are relevant consumptions considered here. The other
difference from Skinner (1987) is that I use logrithm scale in regressions. While
Skinner only conducts this kind of regression for the 1972–1973 CEX data, I extend
this analysis from 1980 to 2002, with components chosen according to what are
available in PSID. For years before 1980 and after 2002, weights are taken from
those of year 1980 and of year 2002. Table 6 and 7 present CEX consumption
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prediction coefficients estimated for all the years 1980–2003. The overall fit of
this sort of consumption prediction is at leat 0.6515 and is as large as 0.8607.
The estimates of EIS by using food consumption are overall larger than by using
aggregate consumption, perhaps partly because aggregate consumption measures
incorporate some of those expenses that are not easily adjusted in the short run
(such as utilities, housing supplements) or related to habit consumption (such as
alcohol or tobacco).
Even if only focusing on EIS estimates from aggregate consumption and the con-
ventional estimation methods, I find the magnitude of at least 0.7 for stockholders,
which is much greater than Vissing-Jørgensen’s (2002a) findings of 0.3 for stock-
holders, although she does find similar magnitude for bondholders. My results
differ significantly from hers, especially for 2SLS and GMM estimates, which very
much agree with each other. At the first sight this may be probably because of the
following reasons: first, my panel data is insulated from attenuation bias caused
by changes on the extensive margin (more or less stockholders) and/or sampling
error for each period of Vissing-Jørgensen’s (2002a) study due to aggregation; sec-
ond, my selected sample is not representative of the overall population, but rather,
the middle to old age households of the population. This can be seen from that the
average age of household heads in 1984 of my sample is about 45. Surprisingly,
the next section shows that correction for the misclassification error sweeps away
much of the discrepancy.
4. A  M E
This section presents that it turns out quantitatively important whether the
misclassification error has been corrected for and taken care of in subsequent
estimations. Conditional on the true status of being stockholders, there exists
a significant chance of misclassification compared to the true status being non-
stockholders. The consequence is that the magnitude difference of EIS between
true stockholders and non-stockholders are exaggerated. This can be clearly seen
from Figure 1, where linear instrumental estimates after correction are 0.34 and
0.02 respectively, versus 1.02 and 0.12 before. This section explains the motivation
and empirical procedure of the correction.
4.1. The Misclassification of Stockholders versus Non-stockholders. The theo-
retical motivation for empirical distinctions between stockholders and non stock-
holders is that stockholders are believed to be the group of persons who are actively
adjusting their marginal rates of substitution of consumption in alignment with
the marginal rate of transformation in the economy. These are the type of persons
who, when expecting the market return to be high, will defer their consumption
to later periods. In constrast, since non-stockholders hold no stakes to exploit the
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stock market opportunity, they will have no incentives to do so. In other words,
a stockholder’s consumption bundle is the interior solution of the intertemporal
optimization problem that s/he faces, which is not the case for non-stockholders,
for non-stockholders’ nonholding status of stocks suggests they have not utilized
the stock market to adjust their intertemporal consumption allocation. Let ∆ = 1 if
someone is a stockholder (as defined in the above by its intertemporal optimization
implication), and ∆ = 0 if the person is not.
It is at much of the researcher’s liberty when it comes to discern the stockhold-
ers and non-stockholders. Some authors try various thresholds of stockholdings
to decide. For instance, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) try three splitting strategies:
thresholds of $0, $1, 000 and $10, 000 in stockholdings respectively; while acknowl-
edging a perfect separation is not possible, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) refers to
households with positive responses to stock categories as stockholders and the
rest as non-stockholders, and also tries splitting the whole sample into three lay-
ers based on these households’ stockholding levels. Likewise, Fillat and Gardun˜o
(2005) vary the definition thresholds of asset holders on a finer grid. Remark-
ably, both Vissing-Jørgensen (2002a) and Fillat and Gardun˜o (2005) fail to find the
monotonicity relationship that is thought to exist when the definition is tightened.
The stockholding data of PSID households are only collected once every five
years during the period of 1984 – 1999, and every other year during 1999 – 2005
when the survey itself became biannual after 1999. Up until 1994, the set of
questions about stockholdings is concerned with stocks in all categories, including
those in IRA’s:
(1994 Questionaire) G129. Do you (or anyone in your family living
there) have any shares of stock in publicly held corporations, mutual
funds, or investment trusts, including stocks in IRA’s?
Starting from 1999, PSID survey has changed the question into not including
stocks in IRA’s:
(1999 Questionaire) W15 (G129). Do you (or anyone in your fam-
ily living there) have any shares of stock in publicly held corpora-
tions, mutual funds, or investment trusts, not including stocks in
employer-based pensions or IRA’s?
As discussed above, I focus on dummy variables derived from answers to this
question in each available year.
Recall the first of the two dummy variables I have defined: D3 = 1 if the
respondent answered “Yes” to this question in all of the years, and D3 = 0 if s/he
answered “No” in all of the years. Apparently this definition of D3 is already very
tight. The aim of constructing this dummy is to consistently characterize whether
someone is a stockholder or not during the periods that I will examine. I assume
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that for any particular household, the status of stockholder or non-stockholder
will not switch from time to time, even if for some years data are not observed.
Therefore the focus of this paper is on imperfect observed, time-invarying status
of stockholding3.
That stockholding status may be imperfect may arise due to genuine measure-
ment errors, such as survey interviewers mistakenly check the wrong box, or
respondents systematically misreport the holdings. Moreover, when it comes to
the difference in risk preference between stockholders and non-stockholders, the
misclassification may also come from the failure to distinguish IRA versus non-
IRA stockholdings and the change of framed survey questions as noted above, for
its asset pricing implications of long-term versus short-term. The examination of
individuals’ annual (or biannual) consumption change within the interpretation of
CAPM indicates the focus on the short-term consumption behavior. But investing
in an IRA account often calls for a long-horizon investing mindset for individual
investors, because they cannot withdraw earnings from this sort of retirement
accounts without incurring penalties, before achieving certain age criteria; in
view of that our measure of consumption change is year by year, long-horizon
stockholdings amount to non-stockholdings for the former does not necessarily
imply contemporaneous consumption adjustments in response to stock market
movements. Daniel and Marshall (1997) demonstrate that longer-horizon (thus
low-frequency) implications of some asset pricing models may help close the eq-
uity premium puzzle that may arise otherwise; based upon their work, including
IRA stockholders may blur the real cross-sectional difference between stockhold-
ers and non-stockholders. This is another reason that the value of the constructed
variable D3 may diverge from that of the true underlying variable ∆.
According to the above discussion, we have that conditional on the observed
status D3
0 < Pr(∆ | D3) < 1 (4.1)
which spells out the misclassification that may exist in the sample. (4.1) implies
0 < Pr(∆ = 0 | D3 = 0) < 1, which indicates that even if some of the households
claimed to hold zero stocks all over the years, they may indeed misrepresented
their status in the survey, perhaps just to avoid the hassle of having to check
current value of their portofolios. Another (rare) possibility is that some of these
households happened to have liquidized or nearly liquidized their stockholdings
around the time of interviews that ask questions about stockholdings, and this sort
of on-and-off investing profile still qualifies them as the inverstors on the margin,
i.e., with the interior solution at the corner location of budget sets.
3The case of imperfectly observed, time-varying status can be extended based upon the approach
outlined in this paper.
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The proxy of D3 for ∆ means that those who claimed they have positive stock-
holdings are more likely to have positive non-IRA holdings than those who claimed
otherwise. This can be written as:
Pr(∆ = 1 | D3 = 1) > Pr(∆ = 1 | D3 = 0) (4.2)
Notice that it immediately implies
Pr(∆ = 0 | D3 = 0) > Pr(∆ = 0 | D3 = 1) (4.3)
Our estimation scheme of switching regressions involves two steps. In the first
step, the goal is to obtain the consistent propensity score of stock ownership given
switching variables and D, the measurement of true ∆ with random error. The
Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton’s (1998) version of Monotonicity Condi-
tion, required for identification for this step, is conditional on true status ∆ rather
than on measured status D3
Pr(D3 = 0 | ∆ = 1) < Pr(D3 = 0 | ∆ = 0) (4.4)
thus is different from (4.2). In fact, (4.4) is stronger than (4.2).To see this, notice
that by the Bayesian Law (4.4) amounts to
Pr(∆ = 1 | D3 = 0) Pr(D3 = 0)
Pr(∆ = 1)
<
Pr(∆ = 0 | D4 = 0) Pr(D4 = 0)
Pr(∆ = 0)
which is equivalent to
Pr(∆ = 0 | D3 = 0) > Pr(∆ = 0) (4.5)
Symmetrically one can get
Pr(∆ = 1 | D3 = 1) > Pr(∆ = 1) (4.6)
Apparently combining (4.5) and (4.6) leads to (4.2) but not vice versa.
Now define α0 and α1 as
α0 = Pr(∆ = 1 | D3 = 0) α1 = Pr(∆ = 0 | D3 = 1)
which hereby maintains the assumption of misclassification error independent
of individual characteristics (Poterba and Summers 1995, Hausman, Abrevaya,
and Scott-Morton 1998). We are to specify a vector of variables, Zi, that will
shift the propensity of owning stocks but not the misclassification. Under normal
distributions of prediction disturbance term in prediction of stockholding status,
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the likelihood function is the same as that in Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-
Morton (1998) 4
L =
N∑
i=1
{
D3,i log(α0 + (1 − α0 − α1)Φ(Z′iγ))
+(1 −D3,i) log(1 − α0 − (1 − α0 − α1)Φ(Z′iγ))
} (4.7)
Suppose after the correction we obtain consistent estimates of propensity score
p(Zi) ≡ Pr(∆i = 1 | Zi) = Φ(Z′i γˆ), the population regression of 4 log Ci,t+1 is the
propensity-score weighted two underlying ones
E(4 log Ci,t+1) = p(Zi)E(4 log Ci,t+1 | ∆i = 1) + (1 − p(Zi))E(4 log Ci,t+1 | ∆i = 0)
= p(Zi)
[
σ1 log(1 + Rt+1) + σ1δ1 4Wi,t+1]
+ (1 − p(Zi)) [σ0 log(1 + Rt+1) + σ0δ0 4Wi,t+1]
In presence of variations of p(Zi) across observations and that Rt+1 would be in-
strumented by individual characteristics, σ1 and σ0 can be separately identified.
However, anticipating possible population moments between p(Zi) and other re-
gressors in (2.4), no general results are available regarding how estimates of co-
efficients from this propensity-score weighted regressions change compared to
before.
In particular, the instrumental variable estimation will be likewise propensity
weighted: recall that in the conventional estimation the first-stage is to obtain the
fitted values of log(1 + Rt) from regressions of log(1 + Rt) on a host of instrumental
variables Ii,t for each group classified by the dummy variable D. Now the only
difference is that both log(1 + Rt) and Ii,t will be correspondingly weighted by
consistent propensity-scores, as D is not a perfect measure of ∆. This can be seen
from
E(4 log Ci,t+1) = pi [σ1 log(1 + Rt+1 |∆i=1) + σ1δ1 4Wi,t+1 |∆i=1 +E(ui,t+1 | ∆i = 1)]
+ (1 − pi) [σ0 log(1 + Rt+1 |∆i=0) + σ0δ0 4Wi,t+1 |∆i=0 +E(ui,t+1 | ∆i = 0)]
where |∆i denotes conditioning on the true type ∆i. Although log(1 + Rt+1 |∆i=1) =
log(1 + Rt+1 |∆i=0) in above expression because of the complete market assumption,
technically Cov(log(1 + Rt+1 |∆i=1),ui,t+1 | ∆i = 1) , Cov(log(1 + Rt+1 |∆i=0),ui,t+1 |
∆i = 0), for the correlation of consumption growth and predicted rates of return
are supposedly different for stockholders versus non-stockholders. For a two-
stage implementation, naturally the first-stage is to obtain the predicted value of
4Note that correction for misclassification error does not require parametric distributional assump-
tions such as normal distributions (Lewbel 2000), although I find probit setup is adequate for this
study.
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the whole term ̂pi log(1 + Ri,t+1) from regressions of pi log(1 + Rt+1) on the vector
of instrumental variables piIi,t+1 (including pi 4Wi,t+1), and likewise for obtaining
̂(1 − pi) log(1 + Ri,t+1). That this is consistent with no misclassification case can be
verified from pushing pi to the limit of one or zero.
4.2. The Two-step Estimation Results of EIS. The subsequent estimation fol-
lows the two-step procedure outlined in last subsection. I apply it to both mis-
measurements of ∆. The dummy variable D3 equals to one if the household owns
any positive stockholdings for all the years, and equals to zero if it does not own
any holdings for all the years; D4 equals to one if the family owns any positive
stockholdings in year 1984, the first year when the information about stockhold-
ings became available. Note that by their sheer definitions the set of D4 includes
the set of D3.
Numerous studies have found that the wealthy and educated are more likely to
invest in stock markets, for instance, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) find that people
with higher income tend to have greater stockownership, and that higher pro-
portion of stockholders is visible for households with college degree (but not for
more advanced degrees). Therefore I choose to use age quadratic, wealth, edu-
cation quadratic, and wealth-education interactions in predicting the propensity
score of stockownership, with the underlying assumption that these variables will
not affect the misclassification probability. The Pseudo R2 of probit regression
for predicting D3 is 0.4752, which is better than the number (0.1203) reported
in Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002), although Pseudo R2 is by no means the
definitive measure of goodness of fit. The Pseudo R2 for predicting D4 is 0.1302.
In the first step of probit estimation with misclassifications, I experiment with
various sets of predicting variables and numerical optimization algorithms lest
that the likelihood function may have non-concave regions, and they all yield very
similar estimates for α0 and α1. Table 3 presents that under normal assumptions
of predicting error, there is essentially no misclassification for those who report
they own some stocks. On the other hand, it is both economically and statistically
significant that a non-trival proportion of non-stockholders may be misclassified:
their true state is one, yet are categorized as zero by D3 or D4. The error of mis-
classifying stockholder as non-stockholder is about 16% for the dummy variable
D3, and the same error is about 35% for the dummy variable D4. This differ-
ence in misclassfiication error may be due to the less strict criterion by D4. After
correction for the misclassification of D3, the education variable exhibits slightly
concave shape of predicting stockownership, which is consistent with Mankiw
and Zeldes’s (1991) findings. Employing logit regressions generates very similar
results.
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Table 4 reports the consistent propensity-score weighted OLS estimates of EIS for
the stockholding status (D3) defined as positive holdings over all of the years (and
5 reports those for D4, defined as positive holdings in 1984)5. I obtain EIS estimates
of about 0.80 for stockholders and about 0.62 for non-stockholders. This pair of
estimates only slightly closes the gap from 0.81 and 0.58 that we have obtained
before. Intuitively, if more stockholders are misclassified as non-stockholders
versus the otherwise, we may expect the true gap of estimates for these two
groups after correction to be closer than estimates from without correction. But this
intuition neglects the perhaps complicated correlation pattern between propensity
scores and interacted regressors, which bars from a simple and general conclusion.
Moreover, estimates reveal that this intuition works out more in the case of D3
rather than D4, perhaps because D4 is itself a very weak definition of stockholders.
Meanwhile, after correction, the estimates are more robust to which crude category
variable, D3 or D4, is used.
The instrumental estimation results are more interesting. The instruments are
supposed to correct for the endorgeneity of log(1 + Rt+1) and ui,t+1. In estimation
directly using the dummy variable D3, instrumental variable estimations open the
gap of EIS estimates for stockholders versus non-stockholders, from 0.81 versus
0.58 to 1.02 versus 0.12 (see Figure 1). The inference from this result is that
stockholders possess idiosyncratic shocks negatively correlated with real rates of
return of the market while non-stockholders possess positively related ones.
However, in propensity-weighted estimation, instrumental variable estimations
not only drive down the estimates, but also dramatically close the gap, from 0.80
versus 0.62 to 0.34 versus 0.02. Without adjustment for clustered year effects, the
coefficient for corrected non-stockholders 0.02 is not statistically significant, but
0.34 for corrected stockholders is statistically significant. The same pattern occurs
to the case of D4, which yields almost the same magnitude of EIS for corrected
stockholders. This is in line with the estimate around 0.3 obtained by Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002a) for stockholders. Also, the estimate for non-stockholders, the
majority of the population, fits into what Hall (1988) has claimed. The explanation
for driven-down coefficients from propensity-score instruments may stem from
the fact that those negatively correlated idiosyncratic shocks that are supposed to
be associated with stockholders now are to be associated with non-stockholders,
due to the misclassification issue. Likewise, the explanation for closing gap from
instruments would be that as instruments detect more difference between two
contaminated groups, the true difference ought to be less, because we know there
5Since a GMM estimation on top of the switching regression framework is unexplored in this
research, in what follows, I only present pooled OLS and IV estimates with robust and cluster-
ajusted standard errors.
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is a great proportion of one group misclassified as another group. Again it is
worthwhile to remind that ex ante we cannot tell how instrumental estimation will
change the results, as the correlation of propensity score with other regressors may
be complicated.
5. C
This paper examines the impacts of correction for misclassification errors be-
tween stockholders and non-stockholders on estimating EIS based upon con-
sumption based asset pricing models. Estimates reveal that there is a significant
proportion of stockholders are misclassified as non-stockholders in the PSID data,
which leads to spuriously large estimates of EIS. I show that accounting for this in-
cidence of misclassificaiton error by applying the switching regression framework
tends to close the gap of the EIS estimates for these two groups. Controlling for
the misclassification error yields results in line with those found in the literature;
otherwise the estimates of EIS from PSID are much larger. These results suggest
taking care of possible misclassifications a prerequisite step for structural estima-
tion on two seperately categorized groups. Beyond the misclassification issue, my
estimates suggest unobserved individual heterogeneity of consumption does not
seem to play an evident role in estimating the version of CAPM considered here.
Since estimates from PSID data with the misclassification correction align with
those from CEX without the misclassification correction, it is natural to ask whether
there is any misclassification error in CEX and how it affects these estimates. It
is not so obvious how the propensity score weighted scheme is adapted to cross-
section averages, although misclassification error is similarly straightforward to
obtain. This can be a future direction of research.
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T 1. Summary statistics for stockholders and non-stockholders
defined as positive stockholdings all over the years
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Definition of D3
(a)
wealth in 1984 (1,000 dollars) 21.68 68.47 -8.70 887.00
age at 1984 44.6 11.7 27 75
education as of 1984 10.8 3.0 0 17
family size of 1984 3.39 1.75 1 11
food consumption of 1984 6093.8 3564.2 16.2 25387.8
aggregate consumption of 1984(b) 20712.8 11173.3 6.4 72698.44
wealth in 1984 (1,000 dollars) 209.06 519.31 -2.60 4720.00
age at 1984 45.4 10.8 30 70
education as of 1984 15.0 2.1 8 17
family size of 1984 3.05 1.28 1 7
food consumption of 1984 9842.2 8906.8 2054.4 94659.1
aggregate consumption of 1984(b) 32221.9 23234.1 6539.18 240475.3
stockholdings (1,000 dollars)(c)
1984 50.00 94.54 0.10 750.00
1989 137.52 57.37 0.60 5000.00
1994 318.46 964.91 0.00 9999.99
1999 345.17 742.46 1.00 7000.00
2001 443.90 1058.34 0.00 9500.00
2003 608.06 1767.21 1.00 15000.00
2005 517.40 952.73 0.00 7000.00
"stockholders" (121 obs.)
"non-stockholders" (425 obs.)
Note: (a) D3 =1 if observations of the PSID longitudinal sample own positive
stockholdings in all years from 1984 to 2005, and D3 =0 if observations of the PSID
longitudinal sample own zero stockholdings in all years from 1984 to 2005; (b) aggregate
consumption of each year is predicted by individual consumption components of PSID
with weights taken from regressions on CEX data of aggregate consumption on the
same set of individual consumption compoenents for the same year; both measures of
food consumption and aggregate consumption are deflated by CPI respectively; (c)
including top-coded cases (coded as 9,999,997 if 9,999,997 or more), and not including
bracket-value cases. From 2001 the question only pertains to non-IRA stocks.
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T 2. Conventional estimates of EIS without correction for
misclassification error
Food Consumption OLS OLS 2SLS GMM
Definition D3
Stockholders 1.2137 1.2137 1.8395 2.0194
(Obs. = 121) (0.1664) (0.4559) (1.0813) (0.9278)
Non-stockholders 0.8201 0.8201 1.0001 0.9843
(Obs. = 425) (0.1073) (0.3673) (0.6531) (0.6082)
Definition D4
Stockholders 1.0694 1.0694 1.5317 1.6826
(Obs. = 398) (0.0862) (0.4092) (0.9254) (0.7940)
Non-stockholders 0.9544 0.9544 1.0305 0.9863
(Obs. = 816) (0.0682) (0.3651) (0.6405) (0.5891)
Aggregate Consumption
Definition  D3
Stockholders 0.8062 0.8062 1.0235 1.0605
(Obs. = 121) (0.1042) (0.3788) (0.8421) (0.6605)
Non-stockholders 0.5763 0.5763 0.1193 0.2469
(Obs. = 425) (0.0742) (0.3307) (0.6054) (0.5516)
Definition D4
Stockholders 0.6958 0.6958 0.7780 0.8229
(Obs. = 398) (0.0569) (0.3431) (0.7053) (0.5479)
Non-stockholders 0.6827 0.6827 0.3126 0.4067
(Obs. = 816) (0.0459) (0.3408) (0.5774) (0.4540)
Notes: D3=1 if observations of the PSID longitudinal sample owning positive
stockholdings in all years from 1984 to 2005, and D3=0 if owning no stockholdings in all
years from 1984 to 2005; D4=1 if observations of the PSID longitudinal sample owning
positive stockholdings in year 1984, and D4=0 if observations of the PSID longitudinal
sample owning no stockholdings in year 1984. Instrumental variables are employed to
account for the potential endorgeneity of stock market returns. Results in the second,
third, and last columns are all adjusted for clustering year effects in standard errors.
(clustered by year)
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T 3. Probit regression of stockholding status with and without
correction for misclassfication error
No Correction With Correction No Correction With Correction
Definitions of Stockholders
α0 —— 0.0112 —— 0.0141
(0.0076) (0.0137)
α1 —— 0.1595 —— 0.3536
(0.0450) (0.0374)
age of 1984 0.1156 0.1559 0.0859 0.0210
(0.0774) (0.1214) (0.0395) (0.0713)
age of 1984 (squared) -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0006)
education level of 1984 0.3514 2.3806 0.4800 0.1981
(0.3945) (1.5113) (0.1748) (0.2999)
education level of 1984 (squared) 0.0068 -0.0656 -0.0097 -0.0018
(0.0115) (0.0521) (0.0052) (0.0085)
age × education -0.0042 -0.0027 -0.0016 0.0007
(0.0032) (0.0061) (0.0016) (0.0031)
log of wealth level in 1984 2.5664 9.5141 0.6466 9.1984
(0.3859) (1.9496) (0.1209) (2.1610)
(constant) -40.7364 -143.7744 -15.1116 -119.8121
(5.8980) (29.6752) (2.2813) (27.5089)
maximized loglikelihood -151.5622 -142.0576 -668.0536 -628.1550
Pseudo R2 0.4752 0.1302
 (D4) (1214 observations)
Note: probit prediction of stockholding ownerships for D3 (=1 if owning positive stockholdings in all years from 1984 to
2005) and D4 (=1 if owning positive stockholdings in year 1984), with correction of misclassification and without; α0 is
defined as probability of true state being of D=0 yet misclassified as D=1; α1 is defined as probability of true state
being of D=1 yet misclassified as D=0; standard errors in parenthesis. 
 (D3) (546 observations)
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T 4. Comparision of direct and misclassification corrected EIS
estimates for stockholders and non-stockholders defined as positive
stockholdings all over the years (D3)
EIS Estimates   OLS  2SLS
Stockholders 0.8062 1.0235
(Obs. = 121) (0.3788) (0.8421)
Non-stockholders 0.5763 0.1193
(Obs. = 425) (0.3307) (0.6054)
Stockholders 0.8037 0.3442
(0.3596) (0.5048)
Non-stockholders 0.6171 0.0248
(0.3305) (0.4609)
Notes: D3=1 if observations of the PSID longitudinal sample are
reported to have owned positive stockholdings in all years from
1984 to 2005; D3=0 if observations of the PSID longitudinal
sample are reported to have owned zero stockholdings in all
years from 1984 to 2005. The propensity score-weighted
regression is E(Y)=pXβ1+(1-p)Xβ0, where p=Pr(∆=1 | Z) is the
consistent propensity scrore after correcting for misclassification
in the probit regression. Insturment variables (lagged dividend-
price ratios, lagged bond default premia, and lagged bond
horizon premia) are used to account for the endorgeneity of
stock market returns in X, also adjusted by propensity scores in
the bottom panel. See text for details on instrumental estimation
for the misclassification case.
D3: propensity score (corrected for misclassification error)
D3: dummy variable
(all clustered by year)
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T 5. Comparision of direct and misclassification corrected EIS
estimates for stockholders and non-stockholders defined as positive
stockholdings in 1984 (D4)
EIS Estimates   OLS  2SLS
Stockholders 0.6958 0.7780
(Obs. = 398) (0.3431) (0.7053)
Non-stockholders 0.6827 0.3126
(Obs. = 816) (0.3408) (0.5774)
Stockholders 0.7834 0.3583
(0.3517) (0.4850)
Non-stockholders 0.5830 -0.0712
(0.3322) (0.4828)
Notes: D4=1 if observations of the PSID longitudinal sample are
reported to have owned positive stockholdings in all years from
1984 to 2005; D4=0 if observations of the PSID longitudinal
sample are reported to have owned zero stockholdings in all
years from 1984 to 2005. The propensity score-weighted
regression is E(Y)=pXβ1+(1-p)Xβ0, where p=Pr(∆=1 | Z) is the
consistent propensity scrore after correcting for misclassification
in the probit regression. Insturment variables (lagged dividend-
price ratios, lagged bond default premia, and lagged bond
horizon premia) are used to account for the endorgeneity of
stock market returns in X, also adjusted by propensity scores in
the bottom panel. See text for details on instrumental estimation
for the misclassification case.
D4: propensity score (corrected for misclassification error)
D4: dummy variable
(all clustered by year)
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T 6. Non-durable goods and services consumption prediction
regressions from CEX samples of various years
Year Obs. R squared
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
1980 550 0.8678 (0.0297) 2.2127 (0.2539) 0.6870
0.7389 (0.0292) 0.1574 (0.0150) 2.1975 (0.2177) 0.7376
0.5844 (0.0236) 0.1064 (0.0143) 0.2017 (0.0149) 2.3180 (0.1797) 0.8476
1981 1644 0.7969 (0.0159) 2.9576 (0.1392) 0.6781
0.6945 (0.0168) 0.1718 (0.0183) 2.5396 (0.1417) 0.7270
0.5417 (0.0132) 0.1184 (0.0130) 0.2360 (0.0114) 2.3701 (0.1004) 0.8462
1982 2164 0.8159 (0.0129) 2.8096 (0.1123) 0.6933
0.7431 (0.0130) 0.1484 (0.0141) 2.3171 (0.1176) 0.7327
0.5683 (0.0129) 0.1081 (0.0106) 0.2234 (0.0122) 2.3260 (0.0880) 0.8378
1983 2302 0.8046 (0.0126) 2.9117 (0.1098) 0.6843
0.7135 (0.0130) 0.1749 (0.0156) 2.3657 (0.1231) 0.7324
0.5543 (0.0124) 0.1289 (0.0127) 0.2228 (0.0112) 2.2928 (0.0959) 0.8403
1984 2628 0.8351 (0.0123) 2.6568 (0.1070) 0.6965
0.7368 (0.0130) 0.1847 (0.0142) 2.1015 (0.1108) 0.7388
0.5650 (0.0139) 0.1428 (0.0119) 0.2272 (0.0134) 2.0646 (0.0875) 0.8394
1985 1301 0.8166 (0.0159) 2.7993 (0.1395) 0.7187
0.7376 (0.0171) 0.1394 (0.0187) 2.4246 (0.1405) 0.7518
0.5771 (0.0167) 0.1028 (0.0159) 0.2212 (0.0154) 2.3008 (0.1153) 0.8390
1986 2623 0.8017 (0.0110) 2.9598 (0.0951) 0.6942
0.7084 (0.0115) 0.1835 (0.0116) 2.3657 (0.0949) 0.7392
0.5420 (0.0110) 0.1366 (0.0099) 0.2406 (0.0097) 2.1921 (0.0799) 0.8436
1987 2546 0.7991 (0.0180) 2.9584 (0.1566) 0.6637
0.6924 (0.0173) 0.2084 (0.0172) 2.2915 (0.1443) 0.7246
0.5302 (0.0143) 0.1459 (0.0129) 0.2387 (0.0101) 2.2301 (0.1071) 0.8407
1988 2578 0.8265 (0.0124) 2.7110 (0.1082) 0.6986
0.7244 (0.0127) 0.1938 (0.0147) 2.1129 (0.1102) 0.7491
0.5707 (0.0129) 0.1358 (0.0113) 0.2189 (0.0104) 2.1096 (0.0836) 0.8482
1989 2601 0.8325 (0.0118) 2.6535 (0.1031) 0.7058
0.7196 (0.0125) 0.2238 (0.0119) 1.9106 (0.1019) 0.7510
0.5643 (0.0115) 0.1655 (0.0100) 0.2340 (0.0101) 1.8036 (0.0810) 0.8557
1990 2598 0.8305 (0.0132) 2.6611 (0.1141) 0.6937
0.7414 (0.0140) 0.1764 (0.0164) 2.0792 (0.1208) 0.7379
0.5625 (0.0121) 0.1155 (0.0135) 0.2531 (0.0093) 2.0467 (0.0966) 0.8497
1991 2607 0.8181 (0.0137) 2.7841 (0.1183) 0.6600
0.6950 (0.0165) 0.2376 (0.0278) 2.0132 (0.1610) 0.7188
0.5358 (0.0127) 0.1602 (0.0220) 0.2437 (0.0101) 2.0112 (0.1232) 0.8383
1992 2608 0.8481 (0.0127) 2.5033 (0.1099) 0.6918
0.7335 (0.0140) 0.2034 (0.0167) 1.9276 (0.1190) 0.7405
0.5745 (0.0151) 0.1395 (0.0168) 0.2323 (0.0113) 1.9130 (0.1074) 0.8436
1993 2683 0.8441 (0.0128) 2.5649 (0.1101) 0.6821
0.7221 (0.0140) 0.2363 (0.0178) 1.7886 (0.1151) 0.7454
0.5603 (0.0119) 0.1517 (0.0137) 0.2465 (0.0099) 1.8415 (0.0901) 0.8559
Food Utility Transportation (Constant)
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T 7. Non-durable goods and services consumption prediction
regressions from CEX samples of various years (continued)
Year Obs. R squared
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
1994 2506 0.8613 (0.0129) 2.4170 (0.1115) 0.6855
0.7234 (0.0163) 0.2617 (0.0245) 1.5759 (0.1308) 0.7452
0.5441 (0.0139) 0.1840 (0.0198) 0.2445 (0.0106) 1.7444 (0.1008) 0.8550
1995 1129 0.8499 (0.0187) 2.5122 (0.1610) 0.6917
0.6814 (0.0191) 0.3214 (0.0202) 1.4646 (0.1460) 0.7562
0.5371 (0.0176) 0.2192 (0.0186) 0.2346 (0.0151) 1.6077 (0.1198) 0.8578
1996 2189 0.8351 (0.0147) 2.6643 (0.1266) 0.6857
0.7093 (0.0158) 0.2376 (0.0246) 1.8898 (0.1528) 0.7470
0.5358 (0.0133) 0.1638 (0.0188) 0.2430 (0.0110) 1.9833 (0.1137) 0.8543
1997 2467 0.8363 (0.0136) 2.6484 (0.1169) 0.6636
0.6693 (0.0126) 0.3392 (0.0140) 1.4338 (0.1101) 0.7521
0.5112 (0.0115) 0.2290 (0.0110) 0.2421 (0.0105) 1.6885 (0.0887) 0.8607
1998 2300 0.8591 (0.0136) 2.4584 (0.1175) 0.6803
0.7163 (0.0156) 0.2748 (0.0224) 1.5368 (0.1278) 0.7535
0.5467 (0.0146) 0.1916 (0.0189) 0.2382 (0.0113) 1.7080 (0.1031) 0.8551
1999 3023 0.8596 (0.0125) 2.4475 (0.1073) 0.6774
0.6848 (0.0134) 0.3500 (0.0183) 1.2057 (0.1136) 0.7618
0.5209 (0.0123) 0.2465 (0.0177) 0.2421 (0.0115) 1.4693 (0.0952) 0.8568
2000 3146 0.8328 (0.0127) 2.6638 (0.1093) 0.6563
0.6710 (0.0131) 0.3322 (0.0192) 1.4421 (0.1254) 0.7498
0.5185 (0.0130) 0.2316 (0.0190) 0.2286 (0.0099) 1.6964 (0.1113) 0.8498
2001 3320 0.8302 (0.0115) 2.7183 (0.0988) 0.6560
0.6643 (0.0115) 0.3535 (0.0158) 1.3483 (0.1070) 0.7471
0.5127 (0.0112) 0.2414 (0.0138) 0.2393 (0.0093) 1.5965 (0.0862) 0.8476
2002 3641 0.8246 (0.0120) 2.7767 (0.1034) 0.6515
0.6508 (0.0131) 0.3592 (0.0220) 1.4194 (0.1281) 0.7456
0.5012 (0.0108) 0.2408 (0.0177) 0.2420 (0.0095) 1.6841 (0.1008) 0.8464
2003 1898 0.8457 (0.0168) 2.5865 (0.1433) 0.6764
0.6657 (0.0165) 0.3377 (0.0232) 1.4470 (0.1642) 0.7607
0.5078 (0.0140) 0.2456 (0.0170) 0.2414 (0.0120) 1.5796 (0.1264) 0.8475
Note: CEX sample for each year (see Aguiar and Hurst (2008) for a detailed description of the sample construction); the
dependent variable is log of non-durable goods and services expenditure; regressors are log of food expenses, of utility
expenses, and of transportation expenses respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Food Utility Transportation (Constant)
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F 1. Graph of EIS estimates by the dummy variable and by
the propensity score for stockholders and non-stockholders defined
as positive holdings in all the years (D3)
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F 2. Graph of EIS estimates by the dummy variable and by
the propensity score for stockholders and non-stockholders defined
as positive holdings in 1984 (D4)
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